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PROFITS, INVESTMENT, AND
BUSINESS CYCLESCYCLICAL DIVERSITIES IN THE FORTUNES OF
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS*
THOR HULTGREN, National Bureau of Economic Research
This paper is based on a study of the quarterly profits reported by large
corporations. The number of companies it was possible to study rises from
17 in 1920-23 to 244 in 1933-38. The findings suggest that at the bottom
of a business cycle the percentage of companies with growing profits,
although low, is rising. It continues to rise during the earlier stages of the
following business expansion, but reaches a peak, and begins to decline,
before business activity reaches its peak. The percentage continues to
decline in the earlier stages of the following business contraction, but
reaches a trough and begins to rise before business activity reaches its
trough.
The aggregate profits of all companies, however, increase both in the
earlier and in the later stages of a business expansion, and fall both in the
earlier and in the later stages of a business contraction. But in most cases
the rise in the earlier stages of expansion is more vigorous, and the fall in
the earlier stages of contraction more severe, than in later stages.
At every stage of the cycle there are always some companies with rising
and some with falling profits.
After 1938 unusual and abruptly changing influences connected with
the war affected profits, and the relations observed in 1920-3 8 between
the percentage of companies with rising profits and the level of business
or of aggregate profits were disturbed, although they may recently have
been re-established.
The material in the paper is pertinent to the study of cycles in several
respects. It reminds us of the diversity of experience that occurs in a cycle
and hence adds realistic detail. It has some interest from a forecasting
point of view, since turning points in the number of companies with rising
profits are found to precede turning points in business. The interval varies
a good deal from cycle to cycle. By the standards prevailing in the physical
sciences, the existence of so variable a lead may not be a very useful dis-
covery. In his paper, however, Mr. Wright reports that a forecast not more
*Theauthor here summarizes and discusses briefly the study he submitted to the
Conference which, the National Bureau published in 1950 as Occasional Paper 32.
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than four months in error has some value in making business decisions.
Roughly, that would be an error of one quarter. lithe number of com-
panies with rising profits had been used to forecast a business turn to
occur three quarters after the date of forecast, the prediction would have
fallen within this range of tolerance in six of the nine instances studied.
The material also bears on questions of investment, or business capital
formation. In deciding whether or not to invest in land, plant, and equip-
ment, business men are presumably motivated by the prospects for profit
on new investment rather than by profits already earned on existing invest-
ment, but there is an intimate connection between the two. If high profits
are earned on existing investment, there is a presumption that additional
profits could be earned on additional facilities, at least if the cost of the
latter has not risen too much. Especially where conditions are competitive,
rising profits are likely to encourage both expansion by existing firms and
the entry of new firms; falling profits are likely to discourage them. More-
over, profits place in the hands of business men funds they can use to
inaugurate projects of whose merits they are convinced on other grounds
than the current rate of return. They influence credit ratings and hence the
ability of to borrow. They affect the market value of stocks
and hence the ability of stockholders to borrow, perhaps for investment
in fields other than those in which the profits were earned. Coming back
more closely to the paper, one may note that a decline in profits does not
need to be general to influence aggregate investment. Business capital for-
mation may at times be concentrated in a few industries that have unusual
technological opportunities or prospects of a long-run shift of demand
toward their products. If their profits temporarily change adversely, aggre-
gate investment may decline even though the aggregate profits of all enter-
prises have been rising.
The investigation described in my paper is part of a program in which
we are trying to find out whatever we can about cyclical changes in costs
and profits, their causes and their consequences. In other parts of that pro-
gram we hope to go beyond the description of changes in profits, to which
this paper is confined. We are trying to learn something on the one hand
about the extent to which changes in cost affect actual and prospective
profits, and on the other hand about the consequences for investment. One
aspect, the reflection of profit changes in market quotations, can be investi-
gated with comparative ease. Other aspects present greater difficulty, both
because data are lacking and because approaches are hard to formulate.
I do not want to leave the impression that the relation between profits
and investment is a one way relation. Profits may lead to investment;
investment may generate profits. I do not mean merely that one must spend
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become convinced (say because certain new inventions mature to the point
of practicality) that new investment will be profitable, even though their
recent actualprofits have not been high or rising. (Perhaps they are newly
formed and have as yet no profit experience.) Suppose further their invest-
ment programs can be financed without diversion of funds from consump-
tion or other investment —byexpansion of bank credit, more rapid turn-
over of deposits, etc. Under these circumstances an investment boom
should increase the flow of disbursements from the business economy to
the public, by which I mean all spending units other than business enter-
prises. Pecuniary savings by the public will not necessarily increase by the
same amount. Now it can be shown —Ishall not bother with the proof
here —thatthe aggregate profits of the business economy equal property
income distributed plus business capital formation, minus nonbusiness
pecuniary savings. The investment boom tends to raise thesecond positive
term in this formula more than the negative term. The immediate increase
in profits will not necessarily accrue to the firms that increase their invest-
ment, at least not in proportion. It will be more or less generally distributed
over business at large. Differences in the rate of growth of aggregate profits
at different times, some of which are noted in the paper, may be explicable
in terms of changing investment impulses and the related expenditures.
COMMENT
IRWIN FRIEND, Department of Commerce
Mr. Hultgren's paper is largely confined to an investigation of the propor-
tion of firms with rising and falling profits at various stages of the business
cycle. This percentage is presented on a quarterly basis for a varying
sample of 17 to 244 corporations, mostly fairly large manufacturing firms,
from the early twenties to date.
Hultgren's main conclusions are: first, that the proportion of firms with
rising profits leads business cycle movements, generally by fairly long
intervals; and second, that the leads are so variable that they tell us little
about when a business turn is coming. Third, he suggests that the cyclical
fluctuations in the proportion of firms with rising profits reflect similar
movements both in sales and in cost-price relationships. The first two con-
clusions are derived from the statistical data while the third is advanced as
a tentative explanation of the empirical findings.228 * PARTTWO
The data utilized for establishing the first two points are admittedly
weak. The sample is quite small even for the industries covered. Moreover,
neither set of ratios used in relating the diversity of profit experience for
the sample firms to the business cycle turns is entirely satisfactory for
arriving at the conclusion that the proportion of concerns with rising profits
leads the cycle by fairly long intervals.
The first set of ratios —whichis obtained by simply dividing the number
of companies whose profits were higher (or losses lower) than in the pre-
ceding quarter by the total number in the sample for the quarter —gives
extremely irregular results with a large number of peaks and troughs that
have no very clear relationship to the business cycle turns.
The second set —obtainedfor each quarter by dividing the number of
companies with cyclically expanding profits by the total sample —gives
much more regular results but may be subject to another type of limitation
whose importance cannot be assessed without access to the basic data. In
particular, in specifying the peaks and troughs of expansion and contrac-
tion for an individual firm on the basis of which the cycles for these com-
panies are determined, the rule is laid down that peaks must be at least
fifteen months apart, and so must troughs. Such a rule may mechanically
tend to exaggerate the lead of this set of ratios, though it could have the
reverse effect, depending on the distribution of. the raw data and the way
in which they are handled.
In spite of the statistical limitations of the sample results, there is basi-
cally little reason to doubt their general validity. The question of their
economic significance is more troublesome. The finding that the proportion
of firms with rising profits 'leads' or reaches a maximum in advance of the
business peak and a minimum in advance of the trough is simply a conse-
quence of the fact that individual firms tend to reach their peak profits
near the top of the boom and their low in profits near the bottom of the
depression. Moreover, this phenomenon is not necessarily a lead since it
is equally accurate to say that the maximum proportion lags behind the
trough.
In view of the fact that aggregate profits roughly coincide with business
turns, it is to be expected that there would be some clustering of individual
firm peaks and troughs in profits around the corresponding business turns.
Because of this clustering, the high and low points in the proportion of
firms with rising profits, which occur when an equal number of firms are
reaching tops and bottoms in the same period, will normally be found
somewhere midway between the turning points. Statistically Hultgren does
find such a clustering but appears to attribute it to the movements in the
proportion of firms with rising profits which he has previously described
and which he discusses in some detail. Apparently he considers the cluster-DIVERSITIES IN PROFITS 229
ing of individual firm peaks and troughs around the business turns as a
phenomenon of secondary importance. Actually, on a priori grounds the
movements in the proportion of firms with rising profits seem to follow
completely from the expected (and observed) clustering —notnecessarily
symmetrical —ofindividual firmpeaksand troughs around the business
turns. In other words, the indicated 'lead' in the proportion of firms with
rising profits is simply a concomitant of The fact that most companies, but
not all, reach their peak in profits near the corresponding business turn.
The emphasis placed on the 'lead' in this proportion presumably reflects
the hypothesis that even though aggregate profits are increasing, the fact
that proportionately fewer firms have rising profits sets in 'motion certain
reactions that cut down aggregate investment, employment, and general
activity. The validity of this assumption and the nature of these reactions
are far from clear. Though I have reservations about ascribing the cause
of cyclical movements to the unimodal distribution of high and low profits
around the business turns, it may be of some value to analyze the variations
in behavior for the different types of companies.
In this connection, it should be pointed out that while the sample data
presented indicate that the scatter of turns in individual firm profits is
concentrated around the corresponding points in the cycle, in seven out of
eight distributions the majority of firms reach their peak or trough before
the turning point. Moreover, this skewness seems to be more pronounced
than is evidenced in the movement of aggregate profits around the business
turns. This appears to imply some tendency for profits of the smaller firms
to lead those of the larger firms. How typical or how general this size differ-
ence is cannot be determined without access to the basic data, and a satis-
factory answer to this question would, of course, require more comprehen-
sive data than are now available, including information for the smaller
companies not covered in the sample discussed in the paper.
However, for the postwar period completely different and much more
reliable data corroborate the inference that profits in smaller firms lead
those in larger firms. Since the first quarter of 1947, quarterly estimates of
profits of manufacturing corporations, as well as other profit and loss and
balance sheet statistics, have been made jointly by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission on the basis of
a carefully stratified sample of well over 5,000 firms. Prior to 1947 similar
information, though not nearly as satisfactory, is available from other
government sources on an annual basis.
It is apparent from these data that in the years following the war the
profits of the smallest manufacturing corporations turned down consider-
ably before those of the largest firms. Moreover, it seems that this relation-
ship between size and turning point in profits was fairly general and not230 PART TWO
simply a characteristic of the extreme size groups.. Though in the absence of
satisfactory quarterly data prior to 1947 it is not possible to tell precisely
when the profits of the smallest size groups turned down, we can be sure
that the turn came either in 1947 or earlier. This is generally consistent with
Hultgren's finding that the postwar high in the proportion of firms with
rising profits was reached in the later part of 1946. The postwar period may
of course be subject to special influences in this respect but annual data of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue indicate a similar picture in the previous
business downturn starting in 1937.
Hultgren spends very little time in considering the economic implica-
tions of his statistical results though he suggests that movements in the
physical volume of sales as well as the encroachment of costs on prices
probably help to explain the early cyclical changes in profits. It seems to
me that not too much work with the sample data would be required to
determine first, the extent to which the cyclical lead of firms depends
simply on their size, and second, whether movements in sales show the
same picture as profits. It would also be interesting, and not too difficult,
to determine the extent to which the lead at the lower turning point was a
reflection of the behavior of firms with profits as against firms with losses.
A priori it is difficult to specify any convincing reasons that would
explain symmetrically on both the upturn and downturn early cyclical
changes of firms on the basis of their size. For example, the physical vol-
ume of sales of the smaller firms might be expected to level off or decline
prior to that of large firms in the advanced stages of a boom, assuming that
newly acquired capacity of the larger firms, plus more favorable prices or
better salesmanship, meant that they were able to capture an increased
share of total business. This would imply in effect that prospective custom-
ers would have preferred using the larger suppliers even prior to the
increase in the latters' capacity but could not be accommodated. A greater
availability of funds to the larger firms permitting them to raise the added
working as well as fixed capital needed may facilitate the expansion of
their operations as compared with their smaller competitors.
On the other hand, it is more questionable that, in a depressed phase of
the cycle, sales of small firms would level off or increase before those of
large firms. However, small firms may well be more flexible in their opera-
tions, and it is possible that their production is more responsive to changes
in orders.
Another possible explanation that would work on both the upturn and
downturn involves the relatively higher fixed costs of larger firms. In a
boom, movements in average unit costs would favor the larger as against
the smaller firms so that it would be possible for sales to increase uniformly
for both groups but for profits to increase only in the larger firms. In aDIVERSITIES IN PROFITS 231
depression the reverse would be true, so that sales could decrease uni-
formly with the larger firms incurring greater losses and the smaller firms
cutting down on their losses.
A lag in labor costs of smaller firms during a boom might also help, at
least historically, to account for the earlier interruption of their rising
profits. During a depression a lag in their labor costs would have a similar
effect if we assume that over-all sales and costs pick up prior to the turning
point in the cycle. Without this unrealistic assumption, and with over-all
sales and costs continuing down or leveling off until the turning point, a
lead in the labor costs of smaller firms on the downturn —ora greater
decline in such costs —wouldbe required to aid in explaining the lead in
their profits.
These are, of course, only a few of the possible hypotheses that will
require testing. The influence of monopolistic pricing in the larger firms
is another factor that should be noted. Several others, including the effect of
new and discontinued firms and the role of inventory profits and losses,
may be discussed briefly. Thus, it is conceivable that the substantial entry
of new firms into the business population during a boom eventually cuts
down on the sales and profits of the smaller established firms with which
they are most likely to be in direct competition. Business discontinuances
during a depression would have the opposite effect. Incidentally, it is barely
possible, though unlikely, that the smaller firms left in business after a
depression has lasted for some time are more efficient than the larger firms
which for institutional reasons continue in business.
Inventory profits and losses also may have affected significantly the
observed results. Hultgren's data are book profits which may have earlier
turning points than profits adjusted for inventory revaluation —orfor that
matter, than profits adjusted for other accounting conventions. Moreover,
there may be differential effects of inventories on book profits of firms in
the different size groups. It does not appear likely that small concerns take
inventory profits and losses earlier than larger companies. Smaller firms,
however, have lower inventories in relation to sales, i.e., a higher turnover
ratio, than the larger firms. Consequently, they may have less inventory
profits in relation to sales in the late stages of the upturn and less inventory
losses on the downturn. It is not known whether in fact the turns in inven-
tory profits and losses follow the turns in the ratio of firms with rising
profits.
Finally, industry differences may help to account for the findings. This
is one possibility that Hultgren does consider in testing for differences
between durable and nondurable goods industries. However, I think that
his conclusion that "makers of durable goods...didnot regularly encoun-
ter an earlier reversal of the trend in their profits than the producers of232 PART TWO
nondurables" should be statistically qualified. Actually, his data suggest
that movements in profits of nondurables industries preceded those in
durables industries in the first half of the '2 D's and followed durables from
that time on. Since in the first half of the '20's the sample of firms ranged
from 17 to 71, while later it ranged from 101 to 244, it would seem to me
that a higher degree of confidence might be placed on the later results.
It probably is not too fruitful at this time to multiply the hypotheses
explaining Hultgren's findings without data to differentiate among them
and, more important, without being too sure of the reliability of the statis-
tical results already obtained. Though distributional analysis in this field
is an essential supplement to aggregative analysis, I think that it is becom-
ing increasingly important to work with samples that will insure adequate
representation of the universe. Even with representative data, the problems
of interpretation are serious enough.
REPLY BY MR. HULTGREN
Mr. Friend gives me too much credit when he calls my remarks on cost-
price relations and volume an explanation. An early decline in profits must
reflect an early decline in the spread between price and cost, or an early
decline in volume, or both. Progress toward explanation will begin when,
with more information on sales, we can tell which of these three situations
existed in each instance. I intended my remarks merely as a caution against
interpreting the data in one way exclusively.
I don't believe the 15-month rule results in the selection of many unduly
early months, or unduly late months, as turns. A priori I see no reason why
it should. Often, moreover, there are no apparent turns (of similar direc-
tion) within 15 months of each other, and no occasion to apply the rule
arises. We do not use the rule in the quarter-by-quarter approach, which
yields the same broad conclusion.
Few, if any, of the companies for which we could get data would ordi-
narily be thought of as small. Further analysis of our materials therefore
would probably not help to answer Mr. Friend's questions about size.